Iran entered a new period after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was struck in a joint United States-Israel attack on February 28. It appears that Iran will now undergo a regime change. Although it is not yet clear how long this will take or how it will unfold, it is evident that the 37-year rule of Khamenei and the 47-year Islamic Republic will change. This has effectively become certain. The Islamic Republic, which has lasted for 47 years, will be surpassed, but what will replace it? That question remains unanswered. It is clear, however, that such a regime change will have significant consequences not only for all the peoples of Iran but also for the Middle East and the wider world.
Iran should not be treated as an ordinary case. We are speaking about a region with one of the oldest traditions of statehood. Historically, within the East-West division that developed in statist systems, Iran has represented the “East.” It is a state that has always held a crucial place in the balance of the Middle East. At the same time, it is a land of historic movements for freedom and therefore possesses a very dynamic social structure. Regardless of the labels attributed to it by Western thought, with its people and particularly its women, it remains one of the most revolutionary societies in the region.
This historical characteristic was clearly visible in the events of the twentieth century. It is well known that the peoples of Iran repeatedly rose up against the collaborationist monarchy that British imperialism attempted to impose on Iranian society. This reality was seen in the freedom struggles of the Azerbaijani and Kurdish peoples following the World War II. It was also visible in the nationalist movement of the 1950s led by Mohammad Mosaddegh. Finally, it appeared in the Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the collaborationist Shah regime.
Because this revolution ultimately transformed into an Islamic Revolution and resulted in the establishment of the Islamic Republic, many circles tend to underestimate or ignore it. Yet the overthrow of the collaborationist Shah regime in Iran at the end of the 1970s was extremely significant not only for the peoples of Iran but also for the entire Middle East and even the wider world. It was not a revolution carried out solely by Islamic forces. Rather, it was realized through the alliance of representatives of all the peoples of Iran, including socialist currents and various political movements. However, in the internal power struggle that followed the fall of the Shah, the forces led by Ruhollah Khomeini ultimately prevailed, and the revolution evolved into an Islamic Revolution.
Nevertheless, during the ten-year period of rule under Ruhollah Khomeini, the regime still carried a certain populist character. The Khomeini administration managed, under its leadership, to combine and hold together both conservative and reformist tendencies. However, after Khomeini’s death in 1989, the then president Ali Khamenei and the speaker of parliament Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani formed an alliance and carried out what could be described as a reactionary coup within the regime. They introduced structural changes to the system and effectively took control of the entire administration. The reformist tendency represented by Khomeini’s prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi was pushed out of power. The office of prime minister was abolished, and although he was not even an ayatollah at the time, Ali Khamenei became the “Supreme Leader,” while Rafsanjani assumed the presidency with expanded powers that incorporated the former authority of the premiership. In this way, the existing populist character of the regime was eliminated and the system was transformed, under an Islamic appearance, into a full-fledged dictatorship of capital and the nation-state.
This is how the regime now associated with Khamenei came into being and eventually entered the phase of change that is being discussed today. After Rafsanjani also died, power passed almost entirely into Khamenei’s hands. From time to time reformist figures were elected president, and particularly the growing youth and women’s movements served as warnings to the regime. Yet instead of responding to these developments with greater flexibility, the Khamenei leadership chose to further consolidate the system of repression.
In fact, especially in recent years, even when it became increasingly clear that the system itself might eventually collapse, the leadership remained rigid and showed almost no willingness to adapt or change. This situation may be seen as a fundamental characteristic of contemporary nation-states. Events in the Middle East in recent years, as well as developments in other parts of the world, illustrate this reality clearly. Recent examples include the cases of Nicolás Maduro and Bashar al-Assad. A somewhat earlier example was Saddam Hussein. Similar outcomes have been observed in many clearly defined nation-state structures, including Turkey and Egypt. Looking at these cases allows us to better understand the nature of contemporary nation-state systems. At times it was thought that the leadership of Ali Khamenei might learn from such examples and show a certain degree of flexibility for change. Yet it has now become clear that this was not possible and that the same rigid pattern has repeated itself.
Certainly, in pointing out these realities, we are neither justifying nor ignoring the existing aggression of the United States and Israel, both in terms of its aims and its methods. After all, all of these actors are part of the same system. Under today’s global capitalist hegemony, it increasingly appears that rather than many different nation-states, there is effectively a single dominant nation-state whose will shapes the behavior of others. Other states are compelled to align themselves with the hegemonic power. Just as an emperor, chief or king issues orders and local officials act accordingly, the same pattern seems to prevail in the current global system. Those who fail to follow this rule risk ending up like Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad, Nicolás Maduro or Ali Khamenei. Therefore, opposition should not only be directed at the ruling power at the top, but at the entire system that produces such realities.
What is happening in Iran today is deeply painful, because the heaviest consequences of war are borne by the people, especially women and children. At the same time, these developments are not a surprise. For weeks and months, the events seemed to be unfolding in plain sight, almost announcing themselves in advance. The so-called Third World War, which some still underestimate, is extremely brutal, and the sides involved are so rigid that it has become almost impossible to prevent such developments. It appears that the system of capitalist modernity can no longer ease the crisis and chaos it faces even through war. Until it is surpassed by a democratic modernity revolution that leads humanity toward liberation, such brutality may continue.
So, what will happen now and in the future? First, we must assume from the outset that nothing will unfold easily or without conflict. Iran is not a passive society; it is an extremely dynamic country in every respect, with many forces seeking to shape the future of governance. It seems clear that most actors want Iran to remain intact and not be divided. For this reason, a territorial fragmentation may not occur. However, it is highly likely that Iran will experience a serious struggle for power in the coming period.
If one asks what the outcome of such a conflict might be, it is clear that no one can predict it with certainty at this stage. The United States has long been preparing the Shah’s son and, as Tom Barrack recently stated, believes that “monarchies rather than republics are more suitable for the Middle East.” It is therefore likely that attempts will be made in this direction. However, achieving such an outcome again appears highly unlikely. After the experience of the Islamic Republic, attempting to impose the monarchy on Iran once more would have no progressive or democratic dimension. On the contrary, a restoration of the Shah regime would push Iran further backward and would only deepen the existing problems rather than resolve them.
In our view, Iranian society will not accept the return of the monarchy. What Iran needs is not the restoration of the Shah regime, but the establishment of a Democratic Republic. The exhausted Islamic Republic should be replaced with a Democratic Republic, because freedoms can only truly exist within such a democratic system. The Democratic Republic would also provide the framework to address the question of national freedom. Likewise, women’s freedom could only become a reality under such a system. The increasingly severe social problems facing the country could only be placed on a path toward resolution through the Democratic Republic. Therefore, it is essential to begin developing a program for a Democratic Republic across Iran and to build alliances around this vision, advancing a united struggle on that basis.
