In today’s deeply integrated and energy-interdependent economic architecture, a confrontation of this nature would act as a systemic shock. Not because the market reacts “emotionally”, but because the material foundations of the global economy — energy, transport, finance and confidence — are criss-crossed by the Persian Gulf and its shipping routes.
The initial impact is already being felt in the energy market, just over 72 hours after the conflict began.
Oil is not just another commodity: it is a cross-cutting input for mobility, heavy industry, mechanised agriculture, petrochemicals and much of global logistics. When its price rises sharply or steadily, it is not only fuel that becomes more expensive; the cost of virtually the entire productive structure rises.
The Strait of Hormuz accounts for a significant proportion of the world’s maritime trade in crude oil and liquefied natural gas. The mere perception of risk regarding its permeability generates geopolitical risk premiums that are immediately incorporated into futures prices. Even without a physical interruption of traffic, the expectation of disruption changes prices.
If the tension continues, the price increase ceases to be speculative and becomes a structural factor of inflation.
Let us remember that Trump spoke of less than a week of conflict and yesterday did not rule out sending troops to the field.
In advanced economies such as the Eurozone or the United States, where inflation has been a recent challenge, a prolonged energy shock would have a double effect. First, it would push up overall inflation by making fuel, electricity and transport more expensive. Second, it could filter through to underlying inflation if companies pass on higher production costs to final prices. This transmission is not immediate, but it is persistent when the energy shock lasts for several quarters.
In terms of growth, the mechanism is clear: higher energy prices mean less disposable income for households and higher operating costs for businesses.
Consumers adjust their discretionary spending; companies postpone investments. On a macroeconomic scale, this translates into a slowdown in gross domestic product.
Macroeconomic models used by central banks and multilateral organisations have historically shown that a sustained increase in oil prices can reduce annual growth by several tenths of a percentage point in net energy-importing economies. In a fragile global environment, that marginal reduction can make the difference between moderate expansion and stagnation.
The effect would certainly not be uniform. The United States, with significant domestic hydrocarbon production, would cushion part of the external impact, although it would still face inflationary pressures. If so, what leeway would the Federal Reserve have to lower interest rates, as Trump has been calling for?
The European Union, highly dependent on energy imports, would suffer more intensely from the deterioration of its trade balance. Asian economies such as Japan and India, major importers of crude oil, would see the weight of their energy bill on their external accounts increase. China, although diversified in suppliers, would also absorb the global price increase, affecting industrial margins and export competitiveness.
Beyond GDP and inflation, the conflict would have a structural impact on international trade. The global economy operates on the basis of extended supply chains, efficient maritime logistics and relatively stable insurance. When a strategic area is perceived as unsafe, routes are altered, maritime insurance becomes more expensive and transit times are extended. All of this increases costs.
The increase in insurance premiums in areas considered high risk does not only affect energy trade. Containers of manufactured goods, agricultural products, and industrial components also bear higher financial costs. In low-margin sectors, a modest increase in transport or insurance can make certain commercial operations unviable.
The aggregate result may be a reduction in the volume of world trade, not necessarily due to capricious tariff barriers imposed by an irresponsible and capricious North American leader, but rather due to increased logistics costs and uncertainty.
Net energy importing countries are already estimating higher foreign exchange payments for hydrocarbons, weakening their external position. Energy exporters could experience temporary benefits from favourable terms of trade, but in an environment of global slowdown they would also face lower demand in other sectors. Global trade will tend to contract or, at best, grow below its potential.
There is also an undesirable financial effect as a result of geopolitical volatility, which often translates into a search for safe-haven assets (bad news for the US, as the dollar is no longer so prominent), the strengthening of certain currencies and the widening of sovereign risk spreads in emerging economies.
The rising cost of external financing further complicates the situation for countries with high energy dependence and limited fiscal capacity. The interaction between expensive energy, lower growth and more restrictive financial conditions can amplify the initial shock.
At the institutional level, states and multilateral organisations are not remaining passive. Central banks are already facing a classic dilemma: tightening monetary policy to contain inflation or easing it to avoid a deep slowdown. Governments can resort to energy subsidies, the release of strategic reserves or supply diversification agreements. However, these measures have fiscal costs and time limits.
In the medium term, a prolonged conflict could accelerate structural transformations already underway. Energy diversification, partial relocation of supply chains, greater investment in renewable energy, and strengthening of strategic trade alliances. Paradoxically, the geopolitical shock could catalyse a deeper economic reconfiguration, with less dependence on vulnerable corridors.
From an intellectual perspective, the most provocative element is this: in a globalised economy, war is not a peripheral phenomenon that affects only the combatants. It is a global redistributive factor that rearranges flows of capital, trade and purchasing power. Interdependence turns regional conflict into a global macroeconomic variable.
The real risk is not only military escalation, but the normalisation of structural uncertainty. When companies and states internalise that strategic energy corridors are permanently volatile, investment decisions change. And with them, the economic geography of the planet changes.
Incidentally, if you look at the references below, you will see how far good intelligence can go in the specific field of conflict and economics. The strange (black swan) event we are experiencing was considered a year ago.
Reference sources consulted:
European Central Bank. (2025). Macroeconomic projections by ECB experts for the euro area, March 2025. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/projections/html/ecb.projections202503_ecbstaff~106050a4fa.es.html
European Central Bank, European Commission. (2025). European Economic Forecast. European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-forecast-and-surveys/economic-forecasts_en
OECD, International Monetary Fund. (2025). World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases
IMF, International Monetary Fund. (2025). World Economic Outlook (WEO) press releases and database. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025
IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2025). OECD Economic Outlook. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/
OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2025). OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2025 Issue 1.
Click to access 83363382-en.pdf
OECD, World Bank. (2025). Global Economic Prospects. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects
