The US is facing a diplomatic overload crisis on steroids. Worse, the Trump administration is relying on a single, highly inexperienced team to oversee three major negotiations. It remains unclear whether this team – or a more seasoned one – can manage what may be the most treacherous of all.
Son-in-law Jared Kushner and crypto-bitcoin partner Steve Witkoff have been leading talks over Gaza, Ukraine and now Iran. Before working with the Trump administration, neither had prior diplomatic experience. To many observers, both are deeply conflicted, with outside business interests that would normally be disqualifying. Kushner manages some $2 billion for Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. Witkoff could potentially profit from a rare earth minerals deal with Ukraine tied to joint ventures, similar to Kushner’s investments in the Gulf.
The president believes he has brought peace to the Middle East and Gaza. Israel’s brutal war against Hamas has subsided, but Hamas still exists. Most of Gaza lies in ruins, resembling bombed-out Berlin and Hamburg during World War II. Gazans face dire economic and sanitation conditions, many of which are life-threatening. Trump’s broader proposal for a Gaza Board of Peace remains moribund.
Ukraine is still at war with Russia. Reports of 1.2 million casualties – killed, wounded or missing – including as many as 325,000 dead since February 2022, appear credible. A cynic noted that a snail might have covered more ground than Russian forces have achieved in four years. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has complained that the US has discussed secret business deals with Russia, allegations the White House has not confirmed.
If Europe is pressed to assume greater defence responsibility, questions arise about whether Germany, Poland, Sweden or Ukraine might reconsider nuclear options.
Meanwhile, the Kushner-Witkoff team has shifted to negotiations with Tehran. The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group is operating in the Arabian Gulf, and the US has reportedly strengthened air and missile defences in Gulf states. A second carrier strike group may be deployed to increase leverage. The immediate question is what realistic outcome can be achieved.
The first Trump administration withdrew from the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. At the time, the International Atomic Energy Agency maintained surveillance systems capable of verifying compliance. Those mechanisms no longer function as they once did.
The Iran negotiations extend beyond nuclear weapons. Washington views Iran as a principal sponsor of Hamas and Hezbollah and is concerned about its thousands of short- and long-range missiles threatening Gulf states and Israel. The US also demands that Tehran cease the violent repression of its own citizens. The carrier presence signals pressure for compromise, yet Iran remains adamant about retaining nuclear energy capabilities and views its missile arsenal as essential to self-defence. While Hamas and Hezbollah have been degraded in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, neither has disappeared. Beyond these crises looms another: the expiration of the New START Treaty, which limited the US and Russia to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 launchers. The United States maintains roughly 5,200 nuclear and thermonuclear weapons; Russia possesses several hundred more. China is expanding its arsenal.
The broader proliferation risk is troubling. Britain, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea are already nuclear powers. If Europe is pressed to assume greater defence responsibility, questions arise about whether Germany, Poland, Sweden or Ukraine might reconsider nuclear options. In Asia, Chinese expansion could prompt debate in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or even Australia. With American diplomacy stretched across multiple high-stakes fronts, the essential question is whether Washington can successfully manage four complex negotiations simultaneously. The answer, at present, is doubtful.
