LEAKS from the US’ own intelligence services have debunked President Donald Trump’s boast that the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator “bunker buster” bombs on June 21 have “completely obliterated” Iran’s facilities that have been developing its nuclear bombs for decades.
Most Western mainstream media appear to have the same sources reporting so, with the British news agency reporting: “A preliminary US intelligence assessment has determined that US strikes over the weekend on Iranian nuclear facilities have set back Tehran’s program by only a matter of months, three sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.” However, the Central Intelligence Agency director issued a blanket denial of the reports the other day, claiming these were merely preliminary.
Chart showing how bunker-buster bomb can be deflected. (Prof. Ted Postol, MIT)
Western media’s sources in the intelligence services claimed Trump was lying.
There is scientific basis to doubt Trump’s claims. Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ted Postol, among several other engineering scientists, have written papers demonstrating that diamond-shaped steel-and-concrete protective layers can easily deflect the GBU-57 bombs, causing them to explode many hundreds of feet above the intended target People’s Liberation Army engineers and Chinese scientists have published a paper in the international, peer-reviewed journal Materials, that provided detailed analysis of how bunker busters can easily be deflected by such diamond-shaped barriers.
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Study by Chinese scientists on effectiveness of bunker busters.
The Americans themselves have disclosed that these bunker busters are designed to explode after penetrating the Earth 60 to 200 feet, depending on the composition of the Earth and protective barriers. But the Iranians know this information through open sources and thus buried their facilities 300 feet or more under a mountain.
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Trump’s bravado and impulsiveness (or exasperation that he couldn’t get Israel and Iran to call a truce) may have backfired to help Iran develop nuclear weapons faster. If the US’ 12 bunker buster bombs dropped on the suspected facility in Fordo didn’t obliterate it, it would be a boon for Iran, a colossal blowback for the US, as this could lead to the following consequences.
– It will give Iran the excuse that indeed the US destroyed its nuclear-development facilities, and that it is no longer pursuing that program — only to accelerate it in some more hidden, more invulnerable facilities. Indeed, days before the attack, US satellites showed convoys of trucks moving out of the Fordo facility, which were most probably the enriched uranium the facility has already produced, to be stored all over Iran.
– The attack would have provided Iran with the data on how to better protect its facilities from the American bunker busters.
– It could prod Iran to accelerate its nuclear bomb making, since the US’ much-touted bomb-buster proved incapable of taking out a protected facility such as Fordo. Trump’s bravado has demonstrated that only a nuclear bomb can take out a deeply buried Iranian facility — which if undertaken would lead to World War III involving all nuclear powers. Nobody wants that, of course.
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Reputation
Furthermore, the US military-industrial complex has earned a reputation of boasting new weapons that didn’t prove as effective in the battlefield as it claimed in its demonstrations, intended of course to convince the US military to buy as much of such weapons as their budgets permit.
Examples of these are the Patriot missile system, which could only intercept 9 percent of Iraqi Scud missiles (the promise was 97 percent) in the two Iraq wars; the AIM-54 air-to-air missile which couldn’t hit a single North Vietnamese plane; and the Himars rocket system (recently offered to the Philippines) which proved very vulnerable to Russian jamming.
A number of experts have provided various explanations regarding why Iran’s nuclear facilities may be invulnerable or highly resistant to bunker buster bombs, including the US’ GBU-57. These insights stem from analyses of the facilities’ design, geological features and the limitations of conventional weaponry, drawing on recent discussions following military actions in 2025.
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Following are some of these analyses, provided by an online research application:
Experts, including Jeffrey Lewis from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, have noted that Iran’s key nuclear sites, such as Fordo, are constructed 80-90 meters (approximately 260-300 feet) or more beneath mountains, often capped with reinforced concrete and sedimentary rock like limestone and dolomite. The GBU-57 designed to penetrate up to 60-200 feet of material depending on composition, may not reach these depths in a single strike. Lewis and others suggest that multiple hits into the same crater are needed, a challenge given the precision required.
Shock waves
Raymond Jeanloz, referenced in discussions of past Earth-penetrating weapon studies, argues that shock waves from bunker busters weaken rapidly in dense rock, with Fordo’s mountain ridge enhancing this natural shielding. This geological “cushioning” could limit damage, a point reinforced by the 2005 Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator research, which found that deeper burial outpaces penetration technology.
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David Albright from the Institute for Science and International Security has highlighted that Iran’s facilities, built since the 2000s with lessons from the 1981 Osirak strike, include ventilation shafts, tunnel entrances and backup systems that may survive initial strikes. Satellite imagery from June 2025 showed blocked tunnel entrances at Fordo, suggesting preemptive mitigation.
Albright notes that even if centrifuges are damaged, Iran’s stockpile of uninstalled units and scientific know-how allows rapid reconstitution, undermining the “obliteration” claims by US officials like Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. (The “Osirak strike” was undertaken by Israeli and US warplanes in 1981, which bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in Osirak near Baghdad. The attackers claimed Osirak was not just built for civilian energy but to develop nuclear weapons. The reactor was destroyed, and Iraq was not allowed by the US to build a nuclear plant).
Vali Nasr from Johns Hopkins University points out that Fordo mountain encasement, initiated post-Iraq’s aboveground vulnerability, was a deliberate strategy to thwart aerial attacks, a design Iran has refined over decades.
Military analysts like Ryan Brobst from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and David Des Roches from the National Defense University emphasize that the GBU-57’s 30,000-pound weight and 5,000-pound explosive payload, while powerful, rely on kinetic force rather than sheer explosive volume. Its penetration (up to 200 feet in concrete or 130 feet in hard rock) may fall short against Fordo’s estimated 90-plus-meter depth, especially if multiple strikes miss the target zone. The bomb’s first combat use in June 2025 showed craters but no confirmed destruction of underground halls, aligning with Steven de la Fuente’s 2023 analysis of Natanz’s deeper tunneling.
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Knowledge
Aaron David Miller from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace questions whether physical destruction can erase Iran’s nuclear knowledge, suggesting that even successful strikes (e.g., at Natanz’s power infrastructure) only delay, not dismantle, the program.
Ali Vaez from the International Crisis Group argues that Iran’s ability to move enriched uranium before strikes, as hinted by pre-attack truck activity at Fordo and Natanz, renders bunker busters ineffective against material stocks. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammad Eslami, claimed in June 2025 that materials were evacuated, a sentiment echoed in posts found on X suggesting covert sites. This resilience, combined with Iran’s historical response to sabotage (e.g., Stuxnet), indicates a program designed to endure military setbacks.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and experts like Mark Fitzpatrick note that any radiological release from a hit would be contained by the underground structure, minimizing strategic impact while allowing Iran to rebuild, as seen with Natanz’s post-Israeli strike recovery.
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The US and Israeli focus on showcasing military might (e.g., B-2 stealth operations) may exaggerate outcomes, as satellite imagery and IAEA reports show damage but not total destruction, contradicting Trump’s assertions. The reliance on a single weapon type, with only 20 to 30 GBU-57s estimated in the arsenal, further constrains repeated strikes, a point raised by Justin Bronk of RUSI.
Experts explain that Iran’s nuclear facilities may be invulnerable to bunker busters due to their 80- to 90-plus-meter depth beneath mountains, reinforced by geological cushioning and concrete; the GBU-57’s limited penetration (up to 200 feet); strategic design with redundant systems and evacuable materials; and Iran’s capacity to relocate or rebuild using existing knowledge.
No wonder US intelligence services jumped to contradict Trump’s “completely obliterated” claim just two days after the bombing. The colossal US failure must have left Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin laughing until their bellies ached.
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