If there is still anyone with the slightest doubt that Benjamin Netanyahu’s delaying tactics when it comes to a ceasefire in Gaza are about his political survival, they should look no further than his decision to expand the war by occupying Gaza City. The Israeli prime minister has decided to do so despite a rare international consensus, with the exception of the US, against the move, and most significantly against the advice of Israeli military chief Eyal Zamir.
By taking such a critical decision in the face of strong opposition from the highest echelons of the Israeli military, Netanyahu has prompted the most severe crisis in civil-military relations since the country’s founding in 1948. To be sure, in relations between the political leaders and the military, it is for the latter to advise about the strengths and risks of executing the government’s decisions, and even question the wisdom of its policies, but ultimately it is the politicians who make the final decision. Yet, no country can win a war if differences between its security forces and political decision-makers develop into a major rift.
In the case of the assault on Gaza, the army is now being asked, after almost two years of an exacting and exhausting war on multiple fronts, to enter a highly populated urban area, expel its population by force, and fight what remains of Hamas, while severely risking the lives of the remaining hostages and the soldiers themselves. The readiness of Israel’s political leadership to compel the military to do something to which it is so strongly and openly opposed is unprecedented.
With Israel’s army composed mainly of conscripts and reservists, the fracture between the country’s political and military echelons is a reflection of a polarization in its society regarding the way in which the war is being conducted. In the aftermath of Oct. 7, Israeli society was at first fully behind the government in its decision to go after Hamas and, regrettably, also to punish the 2.2 million Palestinians of Gaza. Reservists, including those who had not even been called up, volunteered for service, some taking the first available flight to join their units.
As has become increasingly apparent, this is not a war for the sake of Israel’s security or for securing the release of the hostages, or even for defeating Hamas. It is a war fought simply to save Netanyahu’s neck, while many within the military — of all ranks, including the highest — are disillusioned with the government and its policies, which as well as needlessly endangering their lives might result in their being brought before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
Israel has a vibrant society and political system, but the country has become deeply polarized. The Israeli military has usually remained above these rifts, and maintained its reputation among Israelis as the most respected and trusted public institution. Its composition of mainly conscripts and reservists makes it truly a people’s army, and in a country where security is the key concern, it is comforting to believe that the army is both omnipotent and virtuous. But even this institution has been under constant attack by Netanyahu and the ultra-right in an effort to intimidate it into submission and carry out missions that are neither achievable nor moral.
This is not a war for the sake of Israel’s security. It is a war simply to save Netanyahu’s neck.
Yossi Mekelberg
The Israeli military’s reputation, like that of other branches of the security forces, suffered a major blow on Oct. 7 for its inability to defend the communities bordering Gaza from the deadly Hamas attack. Nevertheless, unlike the government, the Israeli military leadership, along with that of the internal security organization Shin Bet, took responsibility for the debacle, and most left the service.
In complete contrast, no Cabinet member, and above all not Netanyahu, has done so. Instead, the Israeli leader continues to blame the security forces, despite the fact that he was the mastermind behind the transfer of suitcases full of thousands of US dollars to Hamas in order to strengthen the group’s position in relation to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, and allowing it to build up its military capabilities. Netanyahu in his audacity is still blaming the reservists, who warned him before Oct. 7 that they would not serve if he undermined the democratic pillars of the Israeli political system, which subsequently led to Hamas’ decision to strike.
The results have been that the military establishment distrusts Netanyahu and most of his ministers, being well aware of their cynical, self-serving nature, and in some cases their extremist ideology. Moreover, it is also the role of the military’s commanders to protect their troops from the unreasonable and irrational demands of politicians. After two years of war, fatigue has crept in, due to the relentless demands made on the regular army, or the hundreds of days served by reservists — all of which has badly affected their families, their financial situation, their studies, not to mention the impact on their mental and physical health.
These orders to the military to risk their lives in Gaza come from a government many of whom have never served in the army, and neither have their sons and daughters; yet they are keen to send other people’s sons and daughters to kill and be killed.
Then there is the case of the hostages, which goes to the heart of one of the most crucial values held by the Israeli military and society — that of not leaving behind a single soldier or citizen, whether they be injured on the battlefield or captives in the hands of the enemy. Abandoning the hostages still held by Hamas is precisely what this government is doing by constantly sabotaging a ceasefire. The government’s ultra-nationalists are entirely transparent that they would rather sacrifice the captives than release more Palestinian prisoners in a deal to seal a safe return, and they will not stop the war until the elusive “absolute victory” materializes, which for them also means the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza and the annexing of the territory.
This is a point of contention between the army and the Cabinet, as those in uniform do not see the strategic value of such a policy, and are trying to make the government aware of the price of such a deadly operation.
Zamir and other high-ranking officers are unlikely to resign their commissions, as this has been a rare course of action in their country’s history. However, it is worrying for Israel to be persisting with a war when its military commanders do not believe in the objectives set out by the government, and do not trust the intentions of the country’s political masters, knowing these lead to dangerously fatigued soldiers, who themselves doubt the politicians and their war aims.
