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A newly published report by Rawadari, an Afghan human rights organization, alleges that the Ismaili Shia community in Afghanistan has faced widening and increasingly organized discrimination since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. The December 2025 report, based on 25 interviews with victims, relatives, civil society activists, and human rights defenders, describes restrictions affecting political participation, employment, religious practice, education, personal security, and property rights, particularly in Badakhshan and other provinces with Ismaili populations.
Rawadari says interviewees consistently reported that Ismailis have been excluded from public and administrative life over the past four years, with little or no representation in provincial or district decision-making structures and no meaningful access to security, judicial, or legal institutions. Testimonies cited in the report describe dismissals from government jobs after religious identity became known, pressure to conceal beliefs, and — in some cases — reported coercion to conform publicly to Taliban-approved Sunni practices to retain employment.
The report also documents what it describes as a sharp contraction in freedom of religion for Ismailis. Interviewees spoke of fear in expressing religious identity, including in educational institutions and when traveling outside Ismaili-majority areas, due to harassment and the risk of being labeled non-Muslim. Rawadari highlights claims of intensified hate speech and “takfir” rhetoric — accusations of apostasy or unbelief — directed at Ismailis in public settings. The report alleges that these narratives are reinforced through clerical sermons, school and university instruction, and public messaging by Taliban-linked institutions, contributing to social isolation and intimidation.
Education and religious instruction feature prominently in the report’s findings. Rawadari states that in some areas Ismaili children have been compelled to attend Taliban-run religious schools where Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence is taught as a compulsory framework, while families who resisted reportedly faced coercive measures such as threats, fines, and, in some cases, physical abuse or punitive actions. The report frames these allegations as part of a broader pattern aimed at weakening Ismaili religious and cultural identity and pressuring conversion.
Beyond religious restrictions, Rawadari records allegations of forced displacement and property seizures, including claims that local Taliban authorities or commanders have taken land and homes belonging to Ismaili families, particularly in parts of Badakhshan. Interviewees also described limited access to justice, saying complaints mechanisms and courts were either inaccessible or openly biased. Rawadari concludes that the cumulative pattern of abuses — if substantiated — may meet the threshold of crimes against humanity, arguing that the persecution described is systematic and targeted at a civilian minority.
Ismailis are a Shia Muslim minority in Afghanistan, with communities concentrated in northeastern and central regions. Rawadari notes that Ismailis live across multiple provinces, including Badakhshan, Baghlan, Bamyan, Kabul, Parwan, and others, and that the community includes Tajik Ismailis in Badakhshan and predominantly Hazara Ismailis in central Afghanistan.
Historically, Afghan Ismailis have combined strong local community structures with shifting strategies of survival during periods of state collapse and civil conflict. In the 1990s, Ismaili forces controlled a substantial part of northeastern Afghanistan, with headquarters in the Kayan Valley in Baghlan province, maintaining organized armed units and negotiating with other factions to preserve territorial autonomy and community security. After 2001, many Ismailis demobilized and moved toward political participation, education, and development-focused engagement during the Afghan Republic.
During the 2001-2021 period, Ismailis expanded their presence in state institutions and civil society, including sustained parliamentary representation (at times holding up to four seats) and participation in provincial councils. Prominent Ismaili figures held senior government roles, including cabinet and advisory positions. In 2015, an Ismaili politician was appointed Minister of Urban Development and Housing, and Ismailis also served in senior advisory capacities and in high-level diplomatic and financial roles. In August 2020, an Ismaili figure was appointed State Minister for Peace, a role tied to coordinating parts of the Republic’s reconciliation and negotiation track during the period of the Doha talks.
A further dimension shaping Ismaili visibility in Afghanistan over the past two decades has been the scale and breadth of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), which has operated in Afghanistan since the 1990s and expanded significantly after 2001. According to AKDN’s own public reporting, since 2002 it and its partners have committed or channelled over $1 billion in development assistance to Afghanistan, spanning humanitarian relief and long-term development programming. AKDN’s portfolio has included health services and hospitals, education and community development, cultural and urban rehabilitation projects, and economic development initiatives such as microfinance (including the First MicroFinanceBank of Afghanistan, which is affiliated with the AKDN network).
AKDN-linked economic and investment activity has also been associated with high-profile commercial projects, most notably the Kabul Serena Hotel, long regarded as Afghanistan’s best-known luxury hotel and for years a hub for foreign delegations and business travelers. Multiple news reports in late 2024 and early 2025 said the Taliban authorities took over the hotel’s operations/management through a state-run entity, ending the Serena chain’s nearly 20-year role in running the property in Kabul. The transition, reported to have taken effect on February 1, 2025, was presented publicly as part of a state-run takeover of operations; the Serena statement referenced a handover to the Taliban-controlled hotel corporation, while media reporting noted the hotel’s previous operation under the Serena brand owned by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development.
Rawadari’s report argues that the current rights situation marks a reversal from the Republic era’s relative integration of Ismailis into political life and development structures, describing a period since 2021 in which Ismailis have been pushed out of public institutions and subjected to multiple forms of discrimination and coercion. The organization calls for protections for minority rights and urges international bodies to intensify monitoring and accountability efforts.
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