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WASHINGTON’s decision to slap a combined 50-percent tariff on Indian imports, half implemented on Aug. 7, 2025, and the rest due on Aug. 27, has forced New Delhi to rethink its risk strategy. Instead of breaking from the US, India is hedging: cooling tensions with China, reopening channels frozen since 2020, and exploring more room to maneuver within platforms like the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and Brics, where trade, payment systems and supply chain options are broader. In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming trip to Tianjin for the Aug. 31 to Sept. 1 SCO Summit is more than ceremonial. It’s a carefully sequenced pragmatic move, securing minimum border stability, restarting the flow of people and goods, and probing whether targeted economic normalization with China can advance without crossing security red lines.
What Modi pragmatically wants in the near term
Modi’s near-term strategy is all about low-drama, managed stability with China, small, tangible steps over grand gestures. Border trade talks aim to reopen the Lipulekh, Shipki La and Nathu La passes after five years, backed by “Border Protocols 2.0” to keep the LAC (line of actual control) quiet. Direct flights may resume next month, enabled by India’s reinstatement of tourist visas for Chinese, with early wins expected by autumn. Diplomacy is also back in sequence, from Wang Yi’s Aug. 18 visit to New Delhi to an expected Modi-Xi meeting in Tianjin.
This thaw builds on the 2024 Border Patrol Agreement, allowing incremental, reversible moves — visas, flights and trade — without major concessions. Behind the scenes, Delhi is considering a selective easing of Chinese investment in nonsensitive sectors and targeted market access adjustments to mitigate the impact of Trump’s 50-percent tariff. The stakes include economic leverage through China’s market, supply chain stability due to the deep integration of Chinese intermediate goods in Indian export production, and stable ties reduce cost volatility and customs friction at a time when tariff shocks make predictability vital, and multilateral optics by framing it all within the SCO as regional cooperation rather than bilateral concession, while signaling to Washington that India will hedge with multiple partners — China, Brazil and Russia — rather than allow anyone to weaponize trade without consequence. The result? A pragmatic hedge, reversible, calibrated, and designed to keep India’s economic and strategic options wide open.
In essence, Modi’s near-term play is managed stability, pragmatic, reversible and calibrated to protect economic and strategic flexibility in an increasingly contested global trade environment. What a pragmatic move indeed on the part of Modi!
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What does Beijing likely want?
Beijing’s likely pragmatic objectives appear to revolve around a calibrated easing of tensions with India while maintaining strategic leverage. Signs of Quad friction, marked not by a collapse but by fewer joint statements targeting China and more “issue-based” stances from New Delhi. This suggests that Beijing aims to loosen India’s alignment with US-led initiatives. A narrative reset is indeed already in motion, with incremental normalization through resumed flights, visa issuances and cross-border trade, shifting the public focus from the LAC standoff to economic cooperation. This is complemented by “market re-entry wedges,” in which Chinese firms are allowed selective participation in India’s EV supply chains, solar sector and e-commerce infrastructure, framed domestically as measures to curb inflation and create jobs.
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Yet, realistically, the path is bounded by clear constraints and red lines: the deep-seated trust deficit at the LAC means one border incident could stall progress; a persistent security-tech firewall keeps telecom, critical infrastructure and sensitive data ecosystems off-limits; domestic politics constrain any move that might appear “soft on China,” forcing small, reversible steps; and trade asymmetry, with India’s deficit vis-à-vis China, demands that normalization be perceived as reciprocal rather than deepening dependency.
In short, Beijing’s play is to slowly erode strategic hostility while accepting that structural mistrust will cap how far and fast ties can improve.
Implications
In retrospect, the Trump 2.0 tariff hasn’t cornered India into picking sides. It is accelerating a tactical Sino‑Indian rapprochement and pushing New Delhi to double down on hedging. By easing border tensions and quietly reopening practical links with China, India is creating economic shock absorbers while keeping its security defenses firmly in place. What’s unfolding is a slow, “test-and-verify” normalization built on tangible outcomes — reopening border trade, resuming visas and flights, and restarting high‑level talks. These are practical, reversible moves that improve India’s economic resilience and bargaining leverage without touching on complex territorial-border-security disputes. Expect the thaw to proceed incrementally, contingent on the border staying quiet and the trajectory of Washington’s tariff policy. In today’s tariff-driven world, resilience isn’t just a talking point or a slogan; it’s the strategy.
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Conclusion: A cautionary tale and lessons for PH?
Lessons for Manila? Here’s the blunt reality: The real story isn’t the glossy photo-ops from Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s India visit or the over media-hyped “joint” naval drill in the South China Sea (SCS) of the India and Philippine navies. It’s about what’s at stake for Marcos’ government from India’s strategic recalibration toward China. And if we’re being brutally honest, the answer is: not much or very little.
Who is Marcos kidding? Who exactly is he trying to fool? Does he seriously think that India, now busy smoothing ties with Beijing after Trump’s 50-percent tariff hammer, would risk jeopardizing its newly rekindled “best friend” relations/status to curry favor with Manila? Seriously?
Strip away the theatrics, and here’s what’s left: yes, on Aug. 4, 2025, the Philippines and India held a joint naval sail inside our EEZ (exclusive economic zone) in the disputed SCS. The Indian lineup was impressive on paper, but in substance? Negligible or should I say minimal.
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My realistic assessment? Less about defending Philippine claims over the SCS and more about showcasing military hardware to a potential arms customer, the Philippines. The so-called maritime cooperation resembles strategic product placement more than a “strategic game changer.” It’s essentially a one-day photo-op, with the endgame of securing a defense sales contract rather than deep security commitments. Let’s call it what it is: “gesture geopolitics.” Naval drills, especially first-time ones, don’t automatically signal a policy shift; they’re ceremonial maneuvers that look good on camera but rarely move the geopolitical needle. Beneath the flags, salutes and formation sailing that look good in the headlines, this was a superficial exercise, driven more by commercial and political posturing than by any binding defense/military alignment. In short, Marcos is overestimating India’s willingness and underestimating India’s own and national strategic interests.
If anything, Marcos and his defense chief Gibo might want to sign up for a crash course on how major powers actually behave when their own national interests and great power rivalries are in play and at stake. It’s a prerequisite before they start bragging about “security” or “defense” deals with countries like India or even the United States. Because here’s the thing: in the real world, these defense/military agreements/contracts serve major powers’ strategic, national and commercial interests first, and only serve ours if, by coincidence, the stars happen to align.
