On Friday 19 December 2025, Dangote Group released a flyer inviting petrol station owners and dealers to register their petrol stations to benefit from Dangote Refinery’s gantry price of petrol at N699 per litre. Dangote emphasised that the offer is available to all petrol station owners and dealers nationwide with free direct delivery service set to commence soon.
However, as good as the intention of the Dangote Group may seem, to reduce the pump price of petrol, the advent of the Dangote Refinery, generally, has generated a flurry of commentary. One narrative particularly stands out: that the Dangote Refinery represents an unchecked monopoly threatening Nigeria’s economy. This argument becomes less credible when critically examined.
Earlier this month, Chairman of Dangote Group, Aliko Dangote publicly accused former Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) chief, Farouk Ahmed, of corruption and economic sabotage, while alleging that regulatory decisions were disadvantaging domestic refiners and enabling excessive fuel imports.
Within days of the accusations and a formal petition to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Ahmed resigned. The Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) boss, Gbenga Komolafe, also stepped down amid fallout from the dispute, prompting President Bola Tinubu to nominate successors for both agencies. The nominees have since been approved by the Nigerian Senate.
For those who do not yet get it, NMDPRA and NUPRC are to the petroleum industry what the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) is to the telecommunications industry. While NUPRC is regulator for the upstream sector, NMDPRA is regulator for the midstream and downstream sector of the petroleum industry. NUPRC regulatory mandate bothers on the production of crude oil, while that of NMDPRA bothers on refining and refined products. Hence, Dangote Refinery is regulated by the NMDPRA.
Since its launch, there have been growing concerns over the alleged monopoly power of the Dangote Refinery. Commentators, politicians, and interest groups have warned that the emergence of a single large private refinery could dominate Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. While such fears may sound reasonable on the surface, a closer examination reveals that the monopoly argument is largely misplaced and, in many respects, intellectually unsound and dishonest.
It is important to note that Aliko Dangote did not stumble into refinery ownership through government favour or regulatory exclusion. He built the refinery by taking a massive private-sector risk in an industry others avoided for decades. At no point did Dangote instruct the Federal Government to deny licences to other investors. At no point was the market closed. The downstream sector remained open, yet few were willing or able to commit the capital, patience, and long-term vision required to build a refinery of global scale.
At the heart of Aliko Dangote’s agitation was not a demand for monopoly, but a plea for policy coherence. His insistence was simple: if Nigeria finally has a global scale refinery capable of meeting domestic demand, then crude oil should be made available to that refinery, and marketers should be encouraged, if not compelled by incentives, to lift locally refined products rather than defaulting to imports.
Yet, in what amounts to optical illusion fear of monopoly, the NMDPRA continues to issue licences to marketers to import fuel from foreign refineries. There is still challenge in making crude oil available for the refinery, The regulatory posture effectively undermined local refining, distorted the market, and weakened the very industrial logic the government claims to support. It is within this contradiction, between stated policy and regulatory action, that Dangote’s grouse lies.
Even, the economic logic is straightforward. Dangote’s refinery has already begun easing persistent fuel shortages and reducing import dependency. It directly addresses the long-standing structural failure of Nigeria’s ageing public refineries, which collapsed under mismanagement and neglect. Local refining capacity saves foreign exchange, creates jobs, and strengthens industrial linkages. Critics should ask: if the goal is economic progress, why oppose public policy that supports value addition rather than importation?
Meanwhile, needless to note, Nigeria’s refinery crisis did not begin with Dangote, nor will it end with him. For more than thirty years, the country depended on importation despite being Africa’s largest crude oil producer. State-owned refineries collapsed under mismanagement, corruption, and neglect. Private investors stayed away, deterred by policy inconsistency, subsidy distortions, and regulatory uncertainty. Dangote entered this hostile terrain not because it was easy, but because he was willing to endure years of delay, rising costs, and shifting government policies.
To now frame his success as a monopoly problem is to punish initiative and reward inertia. Monopoly is not defined by size alone; it is defined by exclusion. Dangote has never publicly demanded that the Federal Government withhold refinery licenses from other investors. Licences remain available. Crude oil is not restricted to one buyer. Any serious investor is free to build, refine, and sell. Competition, after all, is not created by rhetorics but by investment.
The truth is uncomfortable for critics: many of those crying monopoly today had years, if not decades, to invest when the space was wide open. They chose import dependency over industrial risk. They profited from arbitrage, subsidies, and foreign exchange distortions. Dangote chose production. That difference, not regulatory bias, explains the current imbalance.
Nigeria remains heavily reliant on oil exports while importing refined products. This structural imbalance has battered the Naira, inflated prices, and siphoned foreign exchange reserves. Dangote’s investment stands as a corrective force, offering a tangible path toward energy self-sufficiency and economic diversification. Rather than obsessing over the label “monopoly,” policymakers should prioritize enabling environments for other refineries, streamlining licensing, and harmonizing regulation with long-term national goals.
If Nigeria genuinely fears monopoly, the solution is not to attack the only functioning refinery but to encourage more of them. Government should fast-track licences, ensure crude supply transparency, and stabilise policy so other investors can enter the space. Competition grows when barriers fall, not when success is vilified.
The Dangote Refinery should be seen for what it is: a private-sector response to a long-standing national failure. It may not be perfect, but it is a start. Rather than fear its scale, Nigeria should ask why it took so long for anyone to build one at all.
In the end, markets do not reward excuses; they reward action. If monopoly is truly the concern, then the answer is simple, build more refineries, make state-owned refineries, Port Harcourt (I & II), Warri, and Kaduna refineries, work. Dangote did not stop anyone. The market remains open. The nation must focus on structural reform, not fearmongering.
