That Pakistan and the US are actively seeking a partnership in the mining, minerals and energy sectors has been hailed as a breakthrough in economic diplomacy. Federal Minister for Energy Ali Pervaiz Malik’s recent participation in the Critical Minerals Ministerial at the US Department of State also highlighted ongoing efforts to expand foreign investment.
Still, behind the photo ops and press releases lies a thornier question: will this be a catalyst for Pakistan’s self-reliance, or just another chapter in the long saga of outsiders extracting riches?
Pakistan’s reserves of copper, gold and rare earth elements are routinely valued at around $6 trillion. The new understanding with Washington feeds that ambition. A $500 million venture on critical minerals has already dispatched sample shipments to the US. The US Exim Bank’s $1.25 billion financing for the revived Reko Diq copper-gold project is projected to create around 7,500 jobs in Balochistan.
Yet those at the helm would do well to remember how Pakistan’s management of resource contracts has often been erratic. The previous Reko Diq dispute ended in an arbitration award approaching $6 billion, a costly lesson in how not to structure strategic agreements.
Similarly, nowhere are the contradictions of our resource dreams more vivid than in Balochistan. This vast province is among the richest in terms of mineral resources and simultaneously one of the most impoverished regions in the country. The resulting resentment has fueled insurgency and distrust for years. Any new deals with American firms will face the same legitimacy test that Chinese mining projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) did: if local people see jobs, revenue shares and development in their communities, they may cautiously support them; if they remain voiceless spectators to another Great Game of resource extraction, conflict will brew.
This burgeoning mineral partnership also unfolds against a complex geopolitical backdrop as Washington’s interest in Pakistan’s minerals is inseparable from its broader effort to reduce reliance on China’s dominance in critical mineral supply chains. Pakistan may have landed in a sought-after spot. But the flip side is that Pakistan now must perform a high-wire balancing act. If the partnership is framed purely through the prism of great-power rivalry, Islamabad risks becoming a tactical convenience rather than a long-term partner.
Its leadership appears well aware of the peril of picking sides. Tellingly, Islamabad has asked both China and the US to attend its upcoming minerals investment forum, emphasising that CPEC partners and Western firms alike are welcome. However, balance must extend beyond diplomacy to domestic policy. Investors should be required to process and add value locally, transfer skills and adhere to transparent revenue-sharing mechanisms. Otherwise, export earnings may rise while structural dependence persists.
Even with streamlined policies, new mines and processing plants take years to develop, which means that if Pakistan’s leaders truly see this as the ticket to bidding goodbye to the IMF, they must treat it as a non-partisan, long-term national project-one that survives beyond the tenure of any one government. *
