Gender segregation is becoming more widespread and almost every second Muslim finds it problematic to receive medical assistance from a person of the opposite sex, shake hands, kiss the cheek or swim in a mixed pool, while a similar percentage consider Islamic rules to be more important than French law.
According to a well known expression in the intellectual circles of the Parisian Left Bank, everyone is talking about it.
Careful, sensitive poll ahead. This is how Patrick Cohen opened his editorial on France Inter, the French public radio service. Sensitive because of its subject, the relationship French Muslims have with Islam. Sensitive also because of its conclusion, which states that fundamentalism is progressing, especially among the youngest.
The study was conducted by Ifop, the Institut francais d opinion publique, one of the oldest and most respected polling organizations in France. Created in 1938, Ifop is a national reference in political and social opinion research. Its surveys rely on large samples and strict methodology, and they profoundly shape public debate. When Ifop publishes figures, they are taken seriously.
DEMOGRAPHY: This new study will undoubtedly provoke intense controversy. Yet the first point to note is the solidity of its method, which is fully consistent with previous work by the same institute on similar questions. From a sample of fifteen thousand people, Ifop isolated more than one thousand respondents who identified as Muslim. All interviews were conducted by telephone, a traditional technique that avoids the biases of online questionnaires and allows the inclusion of individuals who may be socially vulnerable or less digitally connected.
The first set of results concerns the demographic weight of Islam in France, a topic often imagined rather than understood. In 2016 Ipsos had asked the French to estimate how many Muslims they believed lived in the country out of one hundred people. The average answer was thirty one. The reality is seven. Only seven percent of residents over fifteen identify as Muslim, compared with five point five percent ten years earlier. Meanwhile forty three percent identify as Catholic, one percent as Jewish and thirty seven point five percent as having no religion. The conclusion is clear. There is no great replacement, no small replacement and no Islamization of France.
INCREASED PRACTICE OF FAITH: What the study shows instead is an increase in religious practice among Muslims. Eighty percent describe themselves as religious. More than before pray at least once a day, observe Ramadan and avoid alcohol. The share of women wearing the veil remains stable at thirty one percent, including nineteen percent who wear it constantly. Yet this global stability conceals a generational divide. Among women over fifty, the veil is in decline. Among younger women it is becoming increasingly common. Nearly one out of two women under twenty five, that is forty five percent, now wear it, three times more than twenty years ago.
The reasons for this rise vary. Many cite a religious obligation, but fifty nine percent also refer to social or sexual pressure, whether to avoid men’s gaze or to feel safer. Gender separation is becoming more widespread. Nearly one in two Muslims considers medical treatment by someone of the opposite sex, shaking hands, exchanging a kiss on the cheek or swimming in a mixed pool problematic. A similar proportion believes that Islamic rules are more important than French law. In the event of a conflict between science and religion, sixty five percent believe religion is right.
The study also shows that fundamentalist ideas have gained support among one third of Muslims, while sympathy for movements inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood reaches one fourth. In this context, the question arises as to whether Islam in France can evolve. It is evolving, but the long term trajectory appears more conservative than in the past. Only twenty one percent of Muslims now wish Islam to modernize, compared with twice that share thirty years ago. Among those under twenty five, the proportion falls to twelve percent. The re Islamization of younger generations suggests that this movement will continue and may intensify.
ISLAM AND POLITICS: This trend now has significant political consequences. Increasingly rigorous young Muslims form an essential electoral reservoir for La France insoumise, the main radical left party founded in 2016 and led by Jean Luc Melenchon. Surveys show that Muslims under twenty five follow religious commandments much more strictly than older Muslims. At the same time, Melenchon treats polls selectively, denouncing those that displease him while celebrating those that elevate him. Yet the Ifop study on Islam deserves particular attention.
In the 2024 European elections, sixty two percent of Muslim voters supported La France insoumise. In the 2022 presidential election, sixty nine percent voted for Melenchon. No other social or religious group in France has shown such coherent loyalty to a political movement.
The far left’s interest in Islamist radicalization predates Melenchon. As early as 1994, the British Trotskyist theorist Chris Harman argued in The Prophet and the Proletariat that tactical convergences could exist between the revolutionary left and Islamist movements despite significant doctrinal differences. According to Harman, temporary alliances with political Islam might support the struggle against the capitalist state. He expressed this in a now famous principle stating that one could be with the Islamists sometimes but with the State never.
This intellectual background influenced part of the European far left. Several Melenchon allies, including MP Daniele Obono, who described Hamas as a resistance movement after the events of October the seventh 2023, previously belonged to Trotskyist circles linked to the Socialist Workers Party, where Harman was an important figure. This lineage helps explain why certain leaders of La France insoumise adopt accommodating positions toward political Islam, which they no longer treat as a cultural adversary but as a potential ally in their opposition to the established order.
Jerome Fourquet, director of the Opinion Department at Ifop, recalls an old idea expressed by Andre Siegfried, the father of electoral sociology. When religion enters political contest, it outweighs every economic or social consideration. For decades, secularization seemed to weaken this principle. Today it is returning with force, especially among young Muslims in France, and to a lesser degree among other communities including Jews.
HIJAB AND NIQAB: Melenchon, who is a seasoned strategist, understands that his rhetorical radicalization on issues concerning Islam mirrors the evolution of part of the French Muslim population. The question of the veil provides a clear example. In 2003 only sixteen percent of Muslim women under twenty five wore the hijab or niqab. Today the proportion is forty five percent. According to Fourquet this reflects a reversal of stigma. When a group feels stigmatized, it may strengthen the identity markers that are criticized. The growing use of the term Islamophobia illustrates this mechanism.
The Ifop survey, conducted over more than three decades since 1989, offers a unique perspective on the religious practices and political attitudes of Muslims in France. Francois Kraus summarizes its findings by explaining that the study clearly portrays a population undergoing re Islamization, characterised by rigorous norms and a growing attraction to political Islam.
Among those aged fifteen to twenty four this identity dynamic is particularly strong. Religious practice is intensifying. Gender norms are hardening. Sympathy for Islamist ideas is rising. Mosque attendance among young Muslims has increased from seven percent in 1989 to forty percent today. Strict observance of Ramadan has risen from fifty one percent to eighty three percent. The wearing of the veil among young women has grown from sixteen percent to forty five percent. Sympathy for radical Islamist movements now reaches forty two percent among the young, compared with thirty three percent across all ages and nineteen percent in 1998.
Rejection of gender mixing has also grown. Forty five percent of men under thirty five and fifty seven percent of women refuse at least one interaction with someone of the opposite sex. One out of two young Muslims refuses the traditional kiss on the cheek with a person of the other sex. Furthermore fifty seven percent of those aged fifteen to twenty four believe that Sharia should take precedence over French law. Concerning the origins of the world, sixty five percent of Muslims believe that religion prevails over science and among the youngest the figure rises to eighty two percent.
Support for Islamist currents is growing as well. The Muslim Brotherhood receives the highest level of sympathy, with twenty five percent among all Muslims and thirty three percent among those under twenty five. Salafism, Wahhabism, Tablighi, Takfiri and Jihadist currents add an additional proportion that raises the overall share of Muslims expressing partial or total support for rigorous Islamist currents to thirty eight percent. Among young Muslims the figure reaches forty two percent.
MUSLIMS AND VALUES OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: Ifop emphasizes that these developments contradict any narrative of ongoing secularization. Many religious practices rose again after 2016, influenced by the global impact of the Islamic State and the emergence of a more rigorous generation.
Today seven percent of the French population identifies as Muslim, compared with less than one percent forty years ago. This demographic evolution does not confirm the theory of the great replacement, but it raises serious questions about the relationship between young Muslims and the values of the French Republic, particularly when some perceive society as hostile. This sentiment acts as a powerful political engine. It strengthens community norms, fosters solidarity and directs votes toward parties perceived as protective of Muslim identity.
Muslim voters are estimated at three and a half million. Young Muslims aged eighteen to twenty four number roughly three hundred fifteen thousand. The average level of support for La France insoumise among them stands at sixty five percent. This resentment has consolidated their vote into a stable electoral bloc. Although still a minority at the national level, it can prove decisive in many major cities. If these trends continue, this bloc could exceed seven to eight percent of the national vote and significantly reinforce the strategic influence of La France insoumise.
Young Muslims in France are thus both more religious and more rigorous than their elders. They also display a growing capacity to convert their identity into political expression. These developments pose lasting questions about how France will balance religious identity, social cohesion and the authority of common law, while revealing a rising electoral force that may become decisive in future presidential elections.
The Ifop study ultimately points to a transformation that concerns the entire French nation. France rests on the principle of laicite, enshrined in the historic law of 1905 that established the separation of Churches and the State. This law guarantees freedom of conscience while ensuring that no religion influences the exercise of public power. It is one of the fundamental pillars of French democracy.
La France insoumise therefore faces a decisive choice. Will it uphold this essential republican principle established by the law of 1905, or will it allow political Islam to shape its discourse for strategic advantage. The stakes extend far beyond this party alone. The broader challenge is to preserve a shared civic framework in which religious expression can flourish without superseding the authority of the law. If the law of 1905 remains the guiding light, religious freedom and national unity can coexist. If it is weakened, the cohesion of the French social fabric may be endangered.
The central question is now clearly defined. Will the values of the Republic continue to guide the political order, or will political Islam acquire a growing influence on the French political landscape. The answer will determine the future of laicite, the strength of the national bond and the trajectory of French democracy in the years to come.
