THE summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Tianjin, China, has caught the attention of the world, with pictures of India’s PM Modi, Russia’s President Putin and China’s President Xi smiling together splashed across newspapers, magazines and TV screens around the globe. In contrast to the manner in which the US has dealt in the recent past, particularly with its allies, friends and partners, including levying differential tariffs on each of them, the photographs from Tianjin convey bonhomie, partnership and trust.
India has always placed emphasis on multi-alignment policy, expanding and strengthening partnerships with a swathe of nations. We have been a founder-member of the BRICS grouping and also a long-time member of the SCO. While it was Russia which was pushing for and keen that India join the SCO, New Delhi saw it as a vehicle to build stronger relations with the central Asian republics, while at the same time accommodating our long-time partner Moscow.
Among India, China and Russia, the weakest link in this chain is the India-China relationship. The most recent downturn started in the summer of 2020 when the Chinese PLA moved large numbers of troops to Eastern Ladakh in an attempt to change the status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This led to the Galwan incident, in which several Indian and Chinese troops lost their lives. This dealt a serious setback to India-China relations, which has lasted almost five years.
India has argued that if there is no peace on the borders, it will negatively impact bilateral ties. That is exactly what happened after Galwan. On the contrary, China has been saying that the border issue should be de-linked from the rest of the relationship so that it is not adversely affected if there are border incidents.
The press releases from Beijing and New Delhi after the Tianjin bilateral talks continue to maintain these positions, depicting how far apart the two countries remain on this subject and how serious their differences are.
Over the past year and more, India and China have worked overtime to disengage troops from close confrontation situations in Eastern Ladakh. This has been done successfully, enabling PM Modi to visit Tianjin.
However, large numbers of troops continue to be present at high-altitude locations, indicating that de-escalation has not yet happened. In other words, these troops have not returned to their peacetime locations, hinting that tensions continue and troop build-up at the LAC could happen in short time frames.
During Politburo Member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to New Delhi, both sides agreed to discuss this problem. Hopefully, solutions will be found soon.
The two Special Representatives on the boundary issue, Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, have also agreed to establish a working group to study the possibility of an early harvest in boundary negotiations. This implies the Sikkim sector of the India-China boundary, which was formally delimited by an 1890 agreement between British India and the Qing dynasty China. Since 1947, independent India as well as Communist China have broadly recognised and stuck to the parameters of that British-era agreement.
The current proposal is to abide by that boundary line in Sikkim, but in the form of a new agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China. Even if such an agreement were not to be signed immediately, but done together with the entire boundary resolution, including the Eastern, Middle and Western Sectors (whenever that happens), the idea is to settle the LAC in the Sikkim sector by having both sides abide by the 1890 Convention.
The only problem in this sector will be the tri-junctions between India-China-Nepal and India-China-Bhutan since that would involve trilateral discussions and negotiations with other sovereign states.
The outstanding boundary question between India and China puts limitations on how much India-China relations can improve. As Galwan proved, any upheaval on the border impacts the relationship immediately.
The other complicating factor today is the close alliance-type relationship between China and Pakistan. Operation Sindoor clearly proved how close their military ties are today — with China providing Pakistan with real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance inputs.
Thus, it is not merely the large amounts of defence equipment China sells to Pakistan but also the close military operational linkages which are problematic for New Delhi.
So, from the geostrategic and geopolitical angles, even though India-US ties have soured due to the current tensions, the basis for a strong partnership between New Delhi and Washington DC is clear for all to see. It is time for quiet backroom discussions and negotiations between the two, rather than the daily dose of media-relayed adjectives which we have been treated to.
This does not mean that India will succumb to US pressure on a possible trade deal. We have to stand our ground and even be prepared for short-term pain. We must stand by our conviction that geostrategic realities will reassert themselves sooner rather than later, restoring equilibrium in the India-US partnership.
