Philippine officials acknowledge how united front work is used by the CCP to influence various sectors, overtly and covertly. What remains lacking is a full appreciation of its scope.
In mid-December 2025, officials from the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations paid a courtesy call on newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Manila, Jing Quan. After the usual pleasantries, the association’s chairman, Zhao Qiping, told Jing that overseas Chinese serve “as the most natural and stable link in the relationship” between China and the Philippines. He then went further, stressing that the association “has always maintained a firm stance on major issues and has always stood with the Chinese Embassy.”
Zhao vowed that his group would:
… continue to firmly support the one-China principle and resolutely oppose any separatist activities; under the guidance of the embassy, promote positive social values and unity within the overseas Chinese community; strengthen cultural exchanges, youth cooperation, and public welfare; uphold patriotic traditions; and continue to serve as a solid bridge between the embassy and overseas Chinese in the Philippines, taking concrete actions to safeguard the stability of the overseas Chinese community and the overall situation of China-Philippines friendship.
The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations – formally registered as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Association of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. – is, based on business records, a non-stock corporation with a mix of Filipino and Chinese citizens among its officers. Its stated aim is “to promote and encourage good relations and camaraderie among Filipino-Chinese associations in the Philippines and its members.” It rarely appears in mainstream Philippine news coverage.
Yet in 2024, the federation sent a delegation to Hefei, the capital of China’s Anhui Province, where members met Zhang Ximing, a Standing Committee member of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and head of the Anhui United Front Work Department (UFWD), along with other officials. Zhang expressed hope that the group would “continue to care for and promote Anhui, constantly expand cooperation areas, and use their personal experiences and vivid observations to tell the stories of their ancestral homeland and the friendship between China and the Philippines.”
“United front work,” a long-standing instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), refers to a broad set of influence activities designed to advance the party’s political objectives domestically and overseas. The UFWD, in particular, works to co-opt or neutralize potential sources of opposition. It has been described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a “magic weapon” for advancing the CCP’s goals abroad.
While the UFWD works to cultivate relationships with people of all ethnicities, overseas Chinese communities – regardless of citizenship – are a central focus of this effort.
Among the most sensitive issues Beijing seeks to control are public discussions of the One China policy and Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China. In his New Year’s Eve address, Xi reiterated his commitment to reunification, declaring, “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” That message was preceded by two days of military drills around Taipei simulating the seizure and blockade of key areas, widely seen as a warning against what Beijing labels “separatist forces.”
In October, another organization closely linked to the UFWD convened a forum in Manila opposing Taiwan independence. The Philippine Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (PCPPRC) gathered more than 300 delegates from across Asia for a conference at the Century Park Hotel, according to Chinatown News TV. The forum promoted Taiwan’s “peaceful reunification with China” and was attended by academics, educators, experts, and members of overseas Chinese communities.
At the event, then-PCPPRC president George Tiu described the Taiwan situation as “complex and severe” and called on overseas Chinese to “unite as one” against “any form of Taiwan independence,” echoing official Chinese government rhetoric.
Some members of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry participate in PCPPRC activities or hold overlapping leadership roles. Several PCPPRC members were also present during the federation’s meeting with Ambassador Jing Quan.
These activities are often reported only by Chinese-Filipino outlets, Chinese state media, or through embassy-linked press releases. Notably, Dong Bacui the chief editor of United Daily News – the oldest and largest Filipino-Chinese newspaper – also serves as PCPPRC secretary general and vice president, sits on the board of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification in Beijing, and chaired the October forum in Manila.
Such events rarely draw broader scrutiny – and the groups involved seem to prefer it that way. The sensitivity surrounding broader public awareness became apparent in a bungled attempt to conceal the Manila forum on “peaceful reunification.” Chinatown News TV, which had aired the October forum and earlier PCPPRC events, began systematically removing these videos from its platforms after they were highlighted in late November 2025 by the SeaLight Foundation, a U.S.-based nonprofit maritime transparency organization.
The PCPPRC has operated with far less public visibility than its counterparts in countries such as Australia and South Korea, where activities have been more overt and confrontational. In Australia, the group’s local chapter publicly protested a 2016 international arbitration ruling in the Philippines’ favor that rejected China’s broad South China Sea claims. In South Korea, the chapter organized street protests the same year opposing the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system.
With few exceptions, publicly reported PCPPRC activities do not involve Philippine politicians. In 2023, however, then-PCPPRC Mindanao Council president Johnny Go joined a Chinese embassy delegation that visited then mayor-elect Sebastian Duterte in Davao City. That same year, Zamboanga City Mayor John Dalipe delivered congratulatory remarks at an anniversary event of the PCPPRC Mindanao chapter.
Yet the lack of noticeable government engagement does not mean these UFWD-linked groups are having no impact. Philippine officials have, in recent years, acknowledged how united front work is used by the CCP to influence various sectors, overtly and covertly. What remains lacking is a full appreciation of its scope. United front engagement with overseas Chinese is only one component of a broader influence ecosystem. Analysts often underestimate how these interconnected efforts reinforce one another and amplify their impact.
This matters because China-Philippine relations today are defined by economic interdependence alongside strategic distrust. China is among the Philippines’ top trading partners, yet tensions in the South China Sea have deepened mistrust through overlapping claims, aggressive coast guard and militia actions, and concerns over sovereignty and international law. These dynamics have fueled growing public skepticism toward Beijing.
Despite this, the Philippines has yet to enact comprehensive laws addressing foreign interference and other forms of malign influence by external state actors. SeaLight’s James Carouso and Ray Powell – both of whom served in the U.S. Embassy in Australia – argued that Canberra’s experience offers a cautionary blueprint. “Australia’s parliament moved in 2018 when a series of interference scandals catalysed public opinion and legislative attention to produce the necessary call to action,” they wrote in an opinion piece recently published by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute. “The threat of foreign interference is not theoretical; it is happening now and the stakes for the Philippines are very high. By learning from Australia’s successes, missteps and corrections, Manila can build a counter-interference regime that is robust, responsive and ready to defend its democracy and its sovereignty.”
The challenge is protecting ethnically Chinese Philippine citizens – most of whom are patriotic Filipinos who have contributed immeasurably to the nation – from exploitation by a foreign adversary. Beijing’s United Front apparatus wants to further its goals on Taiwan and beyond through a highly developed state-directed influence network inside this politically and economically significant population. An effective response depends on clearly separating legitimate diaspora participation from coordinated foreign interference through strong, enforceable laws that safeguard the Philippines’ democratic system. Failing to act invites deeper foreign intrusion and the risk of reactionary domestic backlash, neither of which serves the Chinese-Filipino community or Philippine national interests.
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