President Zelenskyy travelled to France today for a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing plus Jared. You know, Jared who is not a US government official, has no position in the US government, and is therefore part of official meetings representing his father in law or something.
A meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing” in Paris brought together 27 national leaders, alongside senior leadership from the EU and NATO, as well as representatives of the US.
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— Maria Drutska (@mariadrutska.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 2:22 PM
Witkoff: We’re largely finished with security protocols, which are important so that the people of Ukraine know that when this ends, it ends forever.
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— Kate from Kharkiv (@kateinkharkiv.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 2:29 PM
If anyone is wondering, we have a law called the Anti-Deficiency Act that makes what Jared is doing illegal.
PARIS, Jan 6 (Reuters) – The United States for the first time on Tuesday backed a broad coalition of Ukraine’s allies in vowing to provide security guarantees that leaders said would include binding commitments to support the country if Russia attacks again.
The pledge came at a summit in Paris of the “coalition of the willing” of mainly European nations to firm up guarantees to reassure Kyiv in the event of a ceasefire with Russia, which invaded its neighbour in 2014 and again at full scale in 2022.
A statement by coalition leaders also said that allies will participate in a proposed U.S.-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism. Officials have said this would likely involve drones, sensors and satellites, not U.S. troops.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, writing on Telegram after the meeting, said the agreements were “a signal of how seriously Europe and the entire coalition of the willing are ready to work for real security”.
But he added that it remained to be determined how the monitoring would work and how the Ukrainian army would be supported and financed.
He thanked the United States “for its readiness to be a backstop in all areas – security guarantees, monitoring a ceasefire and rebuilding.” He said the Ukrainian delegation would continue its talks on key issues on Wednesday.
The statement was not explicitly endorsed by the United States and details of a U.S. role were watered down from an earlier draft, notably removing language that outlined the use of U.S. capabilities to support a multinational force in Ukraine.
But European officials hailed the involvement of the U.S. envoys and their strong comments as evidence Washington stood behind the security framework.
As with all of these leaks of what the US will do, might do, could do, etc, I’ll believe it when I see it.
One minor step left – get Putin to agree to it.
Hers the catch 22: the more Ukraine gets “promised”, the less are the chances that Russia will accept it.
Yes. Ukraine-France-UK signed a letter of intent for troops deployment when peace is agreed to – Budapest memorandum was also letter of intent.
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— Olga Nesterova (@onestpress.onestnetwork.com) January 6, 2026 at 2:20 PM
Because he was in France, President Zelenskyy did not give a daily address today. He did make a formal statement at the beginning of the joint press conference with the other heads of state plus Jared. Video below, English transcript after the jump.
6 January 2026 – 23:07
Thank you very much, Emmanuel, Mr. President, for your invitation and for organizing this!
Keir, Mr. Prime Minister!
Friedrich, Mr. Chancellor!
Steve, Jared!
Distinguished journalists, everyone present!
First of all, thank you for our meeting. And this was one of the most representative meetings of the Coalition of the Willing – twenty-seven heads of state, the European Union, NATO, and representatives of Türkiye, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. It was truly a global meeting, with an exceptionally high level of discussion.
Importantly, the Coalition now has substantive documents in place. This is not just rhetoric – there is concrete progress: a joint declaration by all Coalition countries, and a trilateral declaration by France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. These documents exist, and they signal how seriously both Europe and the entire Coalition of the Willing are ready to work toward real security. Through these documents, we are strengthening our further legal work within countries, with parliaments, so that at the moment when diplomacy succeeds in bringing the war to an end, we will have full readiness to deploy Coalition forces. The details have been elaborated within a system of other documents. It has been determined which countries are ready to take the lead in specific elements of security guarantees – on land, in the air, at sea, and in reconstruction. It has been determined what forces are needed, how they will be managed, and at which levels command will operate. We must also establish how monitoring will function. It must be absolutely clear how the appropriate strength and size of the Ukrainian army will be sustained and financed – I addressed this separately today. We consider this a key element: our Ukrainian strength. And based on our army, all other components will function effectively. Military officials from France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine worked in detail on force deployment, numbers, specific types of weapons, and the components of the Armed Forces required and able to operate effectively. We already have these necessary details. We understand which country is ready for what among all members of the Coalition of the Willing. I would like to thank every leader and every state that truly wishes to be part of a peaceful solution. We had very substantive discussions with the American team on monitoring to ensure there are no violations of peace. The United States is ready to work on this. This is extremely important to us. One of the most critical elements is deterrence – the tools that will prevent any new Russian aggression. And we see all of this. We have also made significant progress with the American negotiating team on the documents, and here in Paris, we’ve already held – and will hold further – separate meetings with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. We believe that we now have documents ready on security guarantees, bilateral, between Ukraine and the United States, as well as trilateral documents. We expect that signing could take place in the near future, and we are already working through these formats. God willing, we will succeed. We value the United States’ readiness to back the forces tasked with preventing any recurrence of Russian aggression. The U.S. backstop is extremely important for us. We understand the potential timing of all these processes, and we all agree that these security guarantees must be legally binding, including approval by the U.S. Congress.
Of course, there are still issues with the documents. Some points in the 20-point document require further work, the most significant being territorial issues. We discussed some ideas that may help. If the teams cannot resolve certain points, they can be escalated to leaders. Today, we will continue, and the Ukrainian team will remain for additional meetings and negotiations. I want to thank you, Emmanuel, for giving us this opportunity for our teams to meet over two days. Thank you, and my sincere thanks also to our American colleagues. But the key point is that the architecture of post-war security is practically already in place. And it is now up to our partners to push for Russia to reach the point of ending the war. Ukraine has never been an obstacle to peace – Russia was the source, the origin of this war, the source of aggression, and in this formula, it is clear who must take the key steps. I thank everyone who is helping us, who is helping to actually make everything so that we have peace. Everyone understands that the aggressor must stop for peace to work. And all instruments are working for this: from our deep strikes, sanctions, and diplomacy, which is so important. It is very important that we have also discussed our air defense, and this issue was also raised by other Coalition of the Willing leaders – this is our daily task. That is true. Ukraine needs air defense missiles, steady supplies, because Russian strikes, unfortunately, continue despite diplomacy. The strikes do not stop. Russia is not yet fully committed to diplomacy, and it is not committed only because it counts on strikes against our energy facilities, our infrastructure, peaceful cities and villages. That is why every one of our meetings addresses air defense as well. And in Mar-a-Lago, we discussed this with President Trump – I thank him very much for his understanding and support – and here in Paris, we are raising the air defense issue as well. The stronger our defense, the stronger our diplomacy will ultimately be. We are grateful to all who are ready to provide rapid assistance.
Glory to Ukraine!
And here’s the video of the joint press conference of the heads of state participating in the Coalition of the Willing plus Jared.
Georgian protesters are singing the Georgian polyphonic song Mravalzhamieri and waiting to ring in Orthodox Christmas, observed under the Julian calendar. 🎶
Day 405 of daily, uninterrupted protests in Georgia — and within minutes, day 406.
🎥 Publika
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— Rusudan Djakeli (@rusudandjakeli.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 3:01 PM
I asked some protesters about their projects, hoping to find some funding for them, & they responded that it’s hard to think of projects when they have no money for basic food or transportation.
That’s where we’re at, while our partners STILL search for ways to “channel.”
#GeorgiaProtests Day 405
— Marika Mikiashvili 🇬🇪🇺🇦🇪🇺 (@marikamikiashvili.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 12:51 PM
January 5 is the birthday of Georgian poet Zviad Ratiani, who turned 55. He was arrested in June 2025 under criminal law after slapping a police officer. Later he said that the act was “a slap for everyone.” On October 9, a Georgian court sentenced him to two years in prison.
#TerrorinGeorgia
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— Publika.ge (@publikage.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 10:25 AM
Ukraine, France, and Britain have signed a declaration on deploying multinational forces in Ukraine after the war! 👏
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— Kate from Kharkiv (@kateinkharkiv.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 1:50 PM
The United Kingdom and France have agreed to establish military hubs across Ukraine following a ceasefire, – Starmer.
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— Maria Drutska (@mariadrutska.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 2:22 PM
Few thoughts on the Greenland saga, summarized in a short thread. Some of these points have already sparked debate on X, but after Miller’s speech, I am even more convinced. 🧵Thread
1/ First and foremost, Denmark is not only a member of the EU, but also a founding member of NATO.
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
2/ Attempts by U.S. officials to question Denmark’s territorial integrity are shocking to many Europeans. However, after watching what Trump has been doing to Ukraine, trying to extract resources through so called mineral agreements after years of partnership, this should not come as a surprise.
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
3/ Some Europeans continue to put their faith in the US. American soldiers will refuse orders, American institutions will intervene, the midterms will save us, Democrats will return Greenland, and so on. The problem is that this mindset places Europe in a helpless position, with no agency of its own
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
4/ In reality, Europe has many levers, financial, economic, and security related. Last but not least, it has military forces that could be deployed to Greenland. The purpose would not be to win a war, but to make a Crimean style annexation impossible
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
5/ A reinforced Greenland would become a major political problem for Washington. Shooting at or bombing your own allies would be devastating domestically and politically for any U.S. administration.
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
6/ Europe also remains the most important infrastructural base for U.S. power projection, including operations in Africa and the Middle East. This reality must be explained to the Trump administration directly, not through “daddy trump” flattery, jokes, or evasive diplomacy.
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
7/ If Greenland is lost this way, more losses will follow. In 2014, we, Ukrainians, were forced to give up Crimea under the pressure from the US to avoid confrontation and war. Crimea was lost, and war still came. This is not a problem you solve by sending angry letters or by giving up
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
8/ Trump acts only when the risks are low. He bombed Iran only after Israel had already suppressed Iranian air defenses, air forces, and command structures. Europe must act collectively, and by acting collectively I mean far more than issuing joint statements.
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
9/ Until you push back and demonstrate real consequences for crossing red lines, you will remain an object in Trump’s thinking, not a subject. Deterrence is the only language leaders with authoritarian mindset understand.
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
10/ If Europe fails to do this, it will not only lose Greenland. It will lose NATO as an alliance and, ultimately, its own strategic and economic autonomy
— Tatarigami (@tatarigami.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 9:08 AM
Nothing is funny anymore, but if the US invading force had to give up Greenland because they started losing toes to frostbites, it would be just a little bit funny
— Minna Ålander 🌻 (@alanderminna.bsky.social) January 5, 2026 at 11:25 AM
Russian spies in Norway operating under the cover of fishermen and tourists.
The commander of the Finnmark Division warned that Russian intelligence activity and hybrid warfare in the region are intensifying.
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— Maria Drutska (@mariadrutska.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 10:05 AM
Russia has been actively operating across Europe: espionage; sabotage; disruption of infrastructure, energy, transport, and communications. And I think unfortunately Europe will see more of this.
— Maria Drutska (@mariadrutska.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 10:05 AM
Ukrainians have opened a “Point of Resilience” in Berlin, a place where people can warm up, charge their devices, and have hot tea 🫶🏻
In one district of Berlin, electricity and heating have been out for the fourth day after cables at a power facility were set on fire.
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— Maria Drutska (@mariadrutska.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 10:58 AM
Tens of thousands of residents remain without power, with restoration promised by January 8.
Local residents said they were frightened, and some even thought Russia had attacked them.
People helping people. Berlin isn’t alone.
🇩🇪🖤🇺🇦
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— Maria Drutska (@mariadrutska.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 10:58 AM
“Ukraine has used these autonomous systems effectively to substitute for other capabilities that it lacks, like artillery and infantry mass.”
Where pretty much all of these types of articles collapse is their presumption that NATO has such capabilities.
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— Sasho Todorov (@sashotodorov.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM
When I look back at my 45 years of military service, one of the highlights of my military education was a battlefield tour I participated in during 2001 at the Somme battlefield, alongside other “high flying” students on the U.K.’s Higher Command and Staff course.
The historical element of it was provided by the late Richard Holmes and we students reveled in his masterful narrative history. Holmes explained how the tank had been fielded in 1916 as a predominantly infantry protection platform to provide cover for troops as they moved across no-man’s land. It was not until 1918, after much improvement, trialing, testing and experimentation, that the Allies worked out that combining tanks with infantry, artillery and engineers — connected by rudimentary battlefield communications and supported by airpower — achieved a combined effect that was worth much more than the sum of its parts. This idea of combined arms maneuver was at the heart of the 100 day campaign which led to victory in World War I and of course blitzkrieg 20 years later.
I will never forget Holmes leading us up a slope from the British lines to where the German lines were placed. At each step, Holmes would remember another father, son, uncle, nephew or brother of that particular “Pals Battalion” and where they had fallen. By the time we got to the top of the hill, not one soldier from this battalion would have been with us and neither was there a dry eye among us.
One day, some readers of War on the Rocks may have the opportunity to engage in a similar tour of the battlefields that today witness fierce combat between Russia and Ukraine. They will be struck by the human costs, but also — as I was — by the lessons to be learned from how they fought.
Indeed, all militaries are naturally keen to learn lessons from the war in Ukraine, but we should be careful not to focus too much on technology. All wars have their own characteristics influenced by numerous factors, including technology, but also doctrine, tactics and the military culture of the protagonists. The Russo-Ukrainian War is no different, and unless we place it properly in context, there is a risk our countries’ military forces will leap to the wrong conclusions.
Ukraine’s battlefield technologies — especially drones — do not yet constitute a new way of warfare. Instead, they function mainly as substitutions for missing capabilities and have produced stalemate rather than decisive maneuver. Lasting change in NATO militaries will come only if these technologies are integrated with existing platforms and, even more importantly, employed through doctrine and concepts that truly realize their potential to deliver advantage. And, much like past transformations such as the development of combined arms and AirLand Battle, that will only happen through extensive experimentation and cultural evolution.
Such change in NATO militaries should be informed by, but not beholden to, lessons identified in Ukraine. NATO militaries should also take account of other considerations such as operational analysis, research and development, science and technology, experimentation, trials, fielding, and training to assess not only how technological developments open up new possibilities for fighting effectively, but also how they may challenge some of our assumptions about the way we will be able to fight. Otherwise, they would risk adopting Ukraine’s lessons wholesale, rather than adapting them to the specific contexts NATO militaries will face in future battles, or basing their future force design on false foundations.
NATO militaries are understandably keen to learn from the war in Ukraine as European militaries work out how to rearm. Holmes is sadly no longer with us, but he would have reminded us that all wars are sui generis, and that care should be taken to apply the right lessons. In Ukraine we see a mix of World War I and World War III. We see technology — including drones, robots, and AI — that presages what we would expect to see in a future war. Yet, we also see a battlefield that, since the initial Russian offensive in February 2022 and the Ukrainian counter offensives later that autumn and in Kursk in 2024, has become remarkably static, attritional and reminiscent of World War I.
Much of the focus of apparent lessons has been on new technologies, especially on what are generically referred to as drones. It seems obvious that future warfare will involve drones, for they have become the biggest killer on the Ukraine battlefield, and their wider potential as cheap but narrowly effective strike weapons has been widely recognized. But rather like the machine gun, artillery, and tanks in World War I, they aren’t yet leading to a decisive outcome, let alone a new way of warfare. So far, they have yielded only stalemate and the type of brutal war of attrition that no army would want to fight.
Ukraine has used these autonomous systems effectively to substitute for other capabilities that it lacks, like artillery and infantry mass. But drones have not yet been used to stimulate a new kind of offensive warfare that might break the deadlock. It seems clear that drones are unlikely to replace capabilities like the tank or the infantry fighting vehicle, as they cannot yet take ground and hold it, maneuver to create shock action, or react in the same way a tank can. As with most new military technologies they seem likely to be a complement to traditional capabilities, at least at first, and they have yet to be effectively integrated with the full range of existing platforms.
Technological advances and the use of off-the-shelf components have made drones of many kinds far more affordable and capable of delivering cost-effective precision strikes at scale. Hence the proliferation of reconnaissance strike drones with mass produceable precision sensing and, more recently, strike. But is this simply a development from the expensive uncrewed surveillance platforms we increasingly fielded in the post 9/11 campaigns, such as Predator, Reaper and Hermes, used predominantly for precision targeting of insurgents or terrorists in favorable airspace? Or are we standing on the threshold of something much more innovative, with swarming drones and mass precision possessing the same potential as the tank in 1916?
As we think about answering this question, we need to unpack the term “drones”, which currently obscures more than it illuminates. We need to be careful not to conflate systems that are not designed to have their software updated (such as the cheap quadcopters and first-person view systems produced in the millions for Ukraine) with those that are software-defined (such as AI-enabled one-way platforms or loitering munitions) and, given their open architecture, are able to be updated via their software and thus retain effectiveness despite rapid battlefield change.
These software-defined systems may have significant latent capability that is not yet being utilized, not least the potential for flexible, unpredictable, yet coordinated fires that might be realized through a version of what is often and loosely called “swarming.” Yet beyond this still nebulous term, there is probably more that could be achieved with these systems if they were used in a practiced command and control structure, combined with a comprehensive battle management system. This would allow for both the benefits of delegated decision making over devolved fires capabilities (which loitering munitions provide) and the coordination and concentration of fires needed to deliver advantage and potentially re-enable maneuver.
However, we should also ask what more could be achieved not only by fully integrating these new systems — and other applications of software-defined defense, especially military AI, including in command and control and battle networks — with the full range of legacy air land capabilities, but by using this newly expanded toolbox to develop new ways of warfare led by doctrine and concepts. In short, we should not obsess on the technology itself, but rather on its potential to lead to a new way of warfare that might change the character of the conflict once more, reasserting conventional deterrence and saving the lives of those otherwise to be lost in the continuing brutality of World War I attrition.
It would be a mistake to treat Ukraine’s use of drones as a ready-made model for NATO. Ukraine is compensating for capability shortfalls, particularly with artillery and infantry. Its drone-centric approach has produced stalemate, not a breakthrough. And NATO should avoid drawing the wrong lessons.
Having seen the way in which AirLand Battle was envisioned and then implemented, the drivers for real change are doctrine and concepts, not gadgets. Technological adoption should be subordinated to evolved doctrine, operational concepts, and culture. Technology alone cannot deliver a new way of warfare, although it can effectively enable it.
Establishing change involves a systematic process of research and development, operational analysis, experimentation, trials, fielding, and realistic training, and it mirrors how past revolutions like combined arms maneuver and AirLand Battle were created — not just technology enthusiasm. We cannot possibly know, for example, whether an autonomous swarm of drones would be the most effective way of dealing with targets in depth unless we test the idea systematically.
This systematic process also involves all the capability lines of development — including doctrine, force design, training and logistics — encapsulated in the British acronym TEPIDOIL and the U.S. equivalent DOTMLPF-P, and will likely lead to very different force and career structures. As with the evolution of the tank from 1916 onwards and AirLand Battle 60 years later, so this evolution should be informed by our armed forces, academia, and industry working together.
Integration is the real source of advantage. Drones, AI, and software-defined munitions should be combined with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, airpower, and effective command and control networks. The real potential of new systems will only become obvious once they are integrated with legacy capabilities into a coherent force with appropriate operational concepts.
It is clear that technology and access to information is allowing much more rapid decision-action cycles, compressing the levels of command, and enabling more precise and longer weapon ranges. This will markedly change the planning yardsticks at every level of command in the land domain, as well as the management of low level airspace — the so-called “air littoral.” This will require new command and control and battle management approaches to be developed, requiring decentralized decision-making enabled by advanced command and control, battle networks, and delegated fires.
Both concepts and command processes will have to deal with temporal compression, spatial expansion, and the saturation of sensors and shooters, which some see as creating a more transparent and uniformly deadly battle space. This saturation creates challenges to be overcome if NATO militaries are to be able to determine how they fight rather than being overwhelmed, discombobulated, and disoriented. But these are also challenges that militaries faced, relative to their own time and technology, in World War I and the Cold War — and overcame them through concept-led change born of iterative thinking and experimentation.
Different theaters will require different operational concepts. A NATO-Europe concept will differ from the Indo-Pacific. For example, Ukraine’s drone-heavy close battle does not automatically translate to operations against Chinese advanced anti-access area denial systems, even though it may have applicability in the close battle in Taiwan or Korea.
In my experience, it is culture that is invariably at the heart of real change. For AirLand Battle, the new way of war required cultural reform: empowering initiative through mission command, accepting risk in training, encouraging mistakes that lead to real learning, and building the adaptability which allows an enemy to be outthought and outmaneuvered — all enabled and empowered by new technology, coherently and effectively employed.
Effecting change today necessitates fielding software-defined and autonomous systems at scale now to learn how to use them — and to test how our assumptions hold up or are amended under the challenges of temporal, spatial, and saturation conditions noted above. True revolution will only come from deploying these systems widely enough to understand their real operational potential and limitations and draw these into operational concepts. History reminds us that this requires a systematic process infused with an organizational and leadership culture that can turn all of this into real change.
Ultimately, which direction that change takes will depend on how NATO countries envision the change they want to make. And how our enemies do the same, for the enemy always gets a vote, not least as they also strive to wring maximum advantage from new technology. Invariably there will be advocates who will direct the technology and the direction of change toward attritional approaches, and there will be advocates who will seek to enable maneuver. NATO militaries will likely need some elements of both, but as servants of Western democracies, they would do well to recognize that their tolerance for casualties is somewhat less than our authoritarian enemies – so envisioning how NATO countries want to fight is the first and most important step in realizing the necessary change.
Much more at the link.
I think GEN Carter makes a second error in addition to not recognizing that the vast majority of NATO member states do not now have the capabilities he’s stating that Ukraine’s drones are compensating for. The second error is that he too narrowly defines way of war.
A Polish man who did not believe that Russia had invaded Ukraine traveled to the occupied territories to see for himself, and died in a Russian prison after being tortured, Gazeta Wyborcza reports.😕
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— Kate from Kharkiv (@kateinkharkiv.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 8:33 AM
The Russians buried in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, Russia after transferring him there and torturing him to death.
Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast:
Pokrovsk direction, Donetsk region. Apparently, the Russians are running low on “traditionally Russian” cannon fodder, so they are throwing mercenaries into the assaults. One such infantryman was spotted by “Spartan” drone operators while moving toward Ukrainian positions.
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 1:35 PM
The Africans were most likely recruited via COSI, which is the legal front for the PMC formerly known as Wagner.
A HIMARS strike hit a concentration of Russian soldiers and several pieces of equipment near Pokrovsk. The strike occurred between Novopavlivka and Chynushyne, about 7 km from the line of contact.
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 5:26 AM
Toretsk. Yet another city being turned into ruins by Russia. Due to the use of fiber-optic drones, fiber wires are increasingly blanketing the city.
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 1:02 PM
The General Staff confirms the strike on the ‘Hercon Plus’ oil depot near the settlement of Streletskie Khutora in Russia’s Lipetsk region last night. It is still burning.
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— Kate from Kharkiv (@kateinkharkiv.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 1:01 PM
Ukraine’s General Staff has confirmed the strike on the “Gerkon Plus” oil depot near the settlement of Streletskie Khutora in Russia’s Lipetsk Oblast. The fire is still ongoing.
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 11:10 AM
Strike UAVs also visited the city of Penza, where the local plant PJSC Biomintez is on fire. It is one of the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers on the Russian market.
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 11:04 AM
Ukrainian media, citing Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, report that Russia is unable to properly maintain its strategic ports in the Arctic.
szru.gov.ua/news-media/n…
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 8:17 AM
According to Ukrainian intelligence, ports in Russia’s Arctic zone are suffering from a lack of essential equipment needed for dredging operations and pier repairs. Most of this equipment was foreign-made, and access to it is currently blocked by international sanctions.
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— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated.bsky.social) January 6, 2026 at 8:17 AM
There are no new Patron skeets or videos today. Here is some adjacent material.
Ukraine’s defenders are tough, but they have 1 soft spot — animals❤️
They go through all the hardships together. There isn’t a safer place on the front, other than beside Ukrainian warriors. And there isn’t a cozier one, other than beside their cute pets.
u24.gov.ua/donate/defen…
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— UNITED24 (@u24.gov.ua) January 1, 2026 at 2:31 PM
