A shadow of uncertainty over the future of AUKUS appears to loom large following the White House’s decision to put the group under review to assess if it was aligned with President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda.
The rapidly intensifying maritime security architecture in the Indo-Pacific prompted the emergence of AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2021. Building on their continued security cooperation, AUKUS sought to deliver on two objectives: i) the acquisition and development of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian Navy, and ii) bolstering cooperation to advance capabilities by way of information and technology sharing. This alliance was strategically formulated with its core objective anchored in the need to maintain a balance of power, ensuring sustainable deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific and deterring aggression in the region. However, a shadow of uncertainty over the future of AUKUS appears to loom large following the White House’s decision to put the group under review to assess if it was aligned with President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda.
AUKUS emerged as a response to China’s increased naval activities in the Indo-Pacific, rendering the regional maritime security architecture vulnerable. Beijing has sought to extensively militarise the South China Sea (SCS) by developing around twenty outposts in the Paracels Islands and constructing seven artificial islands in the Spratlys. Despite the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling in the case of Philippines v. China, Beijing’s continued show of dominance and claim over the majority of the South China Sea by way of aggressive grey-zone tactics, port construction, and artificial island creation has destabilised the region. Similarly, Beijing’s continued military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, such as those conducted about forty nautical miles off the coast of Taiwan in February this year, serve to escalate China-Taiwan tensions. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, Beijing also appears to have set up a zone for “shooting exercises” without prior notice, with twenty-two military aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and its extended line as part of a “joint combat readiness patrol” by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the PLA Navy.
Despite the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling in the case of Philippines v. China, Beijing’s continued show of dominance and claim over the majority of the South China Sea by way of aggressive grey-zone tactics, port construction, and artificial island creation has destabilised the region.
The expansion of nuclear capabilities by major players in the Indo-Pacific highlights the growing importance of nuclear deterrence in the region. Actors such as China, the US, North Korea, and Russia play a significant role in maintaining the fragile balance that prevents the outbreak of nuclear war. Any unilateral threat perceived by these actors risks disrupting the fine balance between deterrence and instability. According to a 2024 report by the US Department of Defense, Beijing’s nuclear arsenal appears to have increased from an estimated 200 warheads in 2018 to over 600 by mid-2024, and is projected to reach 1500 by 2035. With Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine lowering its threshold for use, North Korea’s seemingly everlasting affinity to its nuclear weapons, and other major powers engaged in conflicts across various strategic theatres, nuclear deterrence has emerged as a vital pillar of security thinking, thus placing the Indo-Pacific in a delicate equilibrium built on the idea of deterrence.
Consequently, a frequently overlooked short-term benefit of AUKUS is Australia’s plan to host up to five allied nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) in the coming years. AUKUS partners plan on doubling the number of forward-deployed allied SSNs by the mid-2030s. This is expected to significantly bolster allied deterrence and collective security in the Indo-Pacific. The broader logic of deterrence in the region’s war preparedness lies in positioning China as a potential threat, thereby justifying the development of nuclear capabilities to prevent the outbreak of conflict, thus resting security and peace on the fear of mutual destruction.
The US has long acknowledged the need for a comprehensive security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Given the rapidly intensifying maritime security challenges posed by China, minilateral groupings such as AUKUS have emerged as a means of sustaining regional stability. AUKUS represents both Australia’s and the UK’s decision to align with US interests, while also serving as Washington’s way of leveraging Australia’s maritime geography to bolster deterrence efforts in the Indo-Pacific.
Given the rapidly intensifying maritime security challenges posed by China, minilateral groupings such as AUKUS have emerged as a means of sustaining regional stability.
In many ways, the return of Donald Trump marks a critical reset in American foreign policy, redefining the nature and extent of Washington’s engagement in maritime security efforts globally — particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The decision to review AUKUS and its utility in America’s larger security interest — assessing whether it remains aligned with Trump’s ‘America First Agenda’ — is a critical manifestation of this reset. The AUKUS review is intended to ensure that Washington secures its own arms needs first. With the US struggling to manufacture enough nuclear-powered submarines for itself, the AUKUS agreement finds itself under increased scrutiny.
Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy has reshaped US engagement with the world across various sectors, including trade, diplomacy, security, energy, and immigration policy, among others. The transactional nature of Washington’s engagement under Trump’s leadership renders multilaterals largely obsolete, except for their value as temporary alliances for specific interests, placing partnerships such as AUKUS at risk. However, Canberra, the primary beneficiary of this agreement, has signalled resilience and patience in its response, acknowledging that it is “natural” for a new administration to want to review the previous government’s policies, and noting the UK’s review of AUKUS last year.
Canberra, the primary beneficiary of this agreement, has signalled resilience and patience in its response, acknowledging that it is “natural” for a new administration to want to review the previous government’s policies, and noting the UK’s review of AUKUS last year.
The US review follows concerns of the deal being perceived as inequitable. Washington has asked its partners to increase their military expenditure and move away from a ‘client-patron’ relationship towards a more balanced and equitable participation. Despite Australia’s commitment of A$368 billion over the next three decades to the AUKUS programme — reflecting a long-term strategic prioritisation of defence capability — the US’ push for Australia to raise its defence expenditure to 3.5 percent of GDP signals Washington’s expectation of greater burden-sharing in Indo-Pacific security. Canberra’s commitment to accelerate A$10 billion in defence spending for the next four years, and the UK’s projected increase to 2.5 percent by 2027 and 3 percent by 2034, indicate a calibrated scaling of defence budgets aligned with broader alliance commitments. Therefore, the US’ aim of fostering a more equitable security relationship with its partners appears to be materialising.
The AUKUS assessment, while a reason for caution, may not be seen as entirely concerning given Australia’s enduring role in supporting US interests in the Indo-Pacific and its centrality to the broader maritime security architecture of the region.
The AUKUS assessment, while a reason for caution, may not be seen as entirely concerning given Australia’s enduring role in supporting US interests in the Indo-Pacific and its centrality to the broader maritime security architecture of the region. In light of China’s increasing military prowess and the US’ need to redefine its strategic role in the region, Canberra and Washington agreed on a series of new initiatives under the 2014 Force Posture Agreement during the 2021 Australia-United States Ministerial Dialogue, as a way of enhancing force posture cooperation. These initiatives reinforce the US presence in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging Australia’s strategic location. In an increasingly militarised Indo-Pacific, AUKUS is likely to assume greater importance in preserving peace, contributing to the security framework, and maintaining nuclear deterrence in the region.
Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Shloak Gupta is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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