Kingshuk Chatterjee is professor of history, University of CalcuttaThe recently concluded visit to Israel by Narendra Modi may have more significance than suspected. Modi’s second trip to the country has generated more attention than usually tends to be the case, not least because as many as 17 deals have reportedly been inked in the less than 48 hrs he was there. No less significant is that none of the agreements have any of the features that would warrant the vague announcement that the India-Israeli relationship is ‘now’ of a special strategic character. What are we missing here?
In the last decade, Modi has taken India’s ties with Israel to a level exponentially deeper than what it used to be. Of particular significance has been India becoming the largest purchaser of Israeli defence hardware and software. This includes not only defence platforms but also cyber-tech and UAVs, or drones, that made crucial contribution during Operation Sindoor. Ties have now advanced to include officially declared agenda of defence production under licence in India.
Israel is reportedly expected to play a crucial role in the ongoing modernisation of Indian military’s tech and combat capabilities. Also, India has become a part of the so-called ‘Western Quad’ – also known as I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE and the US), which is steadily working at deepening India’s ties with all three countries, creating a kind of template that might translate someday into a kind of strategic architecture, although India is yet to consider graduating that far.
Benjamin Netanyahu was even talking of India becoming a part of a ‘hexagon of allies’, purportedly including India, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and a few Arab and African allies, presumably the UAE and Somaliland. There has been little enthusiasm from New Delhi so far. Almost nothing came up even in connection with the newly declared special strategic partnership.
So, why did Modi go to Israel, only to rush back to welcome his Canadian counterpart Mark Carney who is visiting India with a stated objective of a relationship reset? Of the 17 agreements and 10 announcements put up by MEA, none warranted a prime ministerial visit – except perhaps to affirm the special strategic partnership. Not least at a time when the US has deployed the largest array of military hardware in the region since removal of Saddam Hussein, ostensibly to target Iran.
Trump hopes to coerce Tehran into abandoning its nuclear programme, and maybe even dismantle its missile programme, rather than moving pieces in place before an attempt at regime change. But since wars begin more upon miscalculation than as a result of careful calculation, there is a margin of risk that a war might break out. And if it does, Tehran might abandon its policy of restraint and measured escalation, and broaden the conflict to a regional scale. At such a time, Modi’s visit to Israel was an unnecessary, if calculated, risk.
There are two broad explanations being tossed about. One, that India had avoided taking sides in the June 2025 war between Israel and Iran, both countries with whom it has a very good relationship over the last 35 yrs. At a time when the region is poised on a major recalibration if the US goes to war with Iran, India’s firm steps toward declaring special strategic relationship with Israel finally pitches New Delhi in ‘Camp USA’.
Two, Modi’s extending a personal favour to Netanyahu, a person that the Indian PM has often referred to as a ‘friend’. Netanyahu today is perhaps the most embattled PM in the history of Israel. Domestically, his political position is precarious, pressed by a number of adversaries as much as by hardline right-wingers. He is also looking at a possible prison term on charges of corruption once he loses office.
Modi’s visit buttresses Netanyahu by showing that Trump is not the only leader of stature standing by his side. If this helps the Israeli PM electorally in any manner, New Delhi hopes to reap benefits when the prospective FTA declared during this trip materialises in the months ahead.
A third explanation for the trip can’t be ruled out completely. Despite the hyper-nationalistic motives generally imputed to the Modi government’s policies, New Delhi has actually been walking on eggshells since October 2023. From the time Adani Group acquired a stake in the development of Haifa port, and India enthusiastically joined the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project, the spanner has been thrown so effectively in the works by Israel’s disproportionate response to Gaza that even deft footwork by the Indian establishment has proven insufficient.
Voicing a categorical denunciation of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel as much as support for the two-state solution may have won India neither new friends nor plaudits. But such balancing has certainly prevented New Delhi from alienating Israel or those affected by its misadventures in Palestine and elsewhere. By going to Israel at a time few would – and there, once again, voicing support for Gaza Peace Plan (thus, presumably for a Palestine that would not become a part of Israel) – GoI seems to have persisted in its old balancing game.
In a time of likely regional turmoil, it may be good if Delhi does nothing new and bold, without actually drifting away. The PM’s visit may have managed just that.
The writer is professor of history,Calcutta University
